

IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Applicant(s): Richard A. Chapman

Group Art Unit: 2173 / Conf. No. 2422

Application No.: 10/751,616

Examiner: Ulrich, Nicholas S.

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Docket No.: END920030134US1

Title: **METHODS, SYSTEMS AND COMPUTER PROGRAM PRODUCTS FOR
ASSISTED BROWSER NAVIGATION**

Commissioner for Patents
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

This Reply Brief is in reply to the Examiner's Answer mailed January 23, 2009.

GROUND OF REJECTION 1

Claims 47 and 48 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over Sheldon et al. (US 5954798) in view of Gavrilescu et al. (US 2002/0198941 A1).

The Examiner's Answer, pages 9-21 presents significant new analysis applying the Shelton prior art reference to claims 47 and 48. The new analysis in the Examiner's Answer was not presented previously in the Final office Action dated August 1, 2008. Accordingly, the Examiner's Answer correctly states that the Appeal Brief has made assumptions regarding the Examiner's interpretation of the Shelton reference which are contrary to the new analysis presented in the Examiner's Answer. Therefore, since the present Reply Brief addresses the Examiner's new analysis in the Examiner's Answer, the analysis in the present Reply Brief is significantly more pertinent to the claim rejections under appeal than is the analysis presented in the Appeal Brief.

Claim 47

Appellant respectfully contends that claim 47 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu, because Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu does not teach or suggest each and every feature of claim 47.

A first reason why claim 47 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu is that Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu does not teach or suggest the feature:

“a server *creating a user context* that reflects a context of a session between a user browser and the server;

said server *creating a consultant context* that reflects a context of a session between a consultant browser and the server; ...

said server receiving the transmitted context information and *storing the received context information in the consultant context*; ...

said server *storing the identified context information in the user context*” (emphasis added).

The Examiner’s Answer, page 10, lines 12-14 recites: “The server then manages, tracks, and records all the activities of the browser participating in the session. The recorded activities clearly demonstrate a context of a session between a browser and a server.”

The Examiner’s Answer, page 10, line 20 - page 11, line 5 recites: “The only difference between the limitations is the use of “consultant” instead of “user” when labeling the browsers and context. As indicated in the cited passages of Shelton, all browsers, whether labeled as a “user” browser or “consultant” browser, are managed and tracked by the server in order to establish sessions and record activities associated with the browsers and server. Therefore Shelton does in fact teach creating context for two browsers, which could be labeled as “user” and “consultant” respectively.”

In response, Appellant is interpreting the preceding quotes in the Examiner’s Answer as alleging that the data fields (containing data pertaining to web browsing by the user browser during a session) in session table 145 (see Shelton, FIG. 6 and col. 9 line 63 - col. 10, line 54) is the user context created by the WTS server 145 (see Shelton, FIG. 1). Thus, the created user context contains data pertaining to web browsing by the user browser during a session.

Similarly, Appellant is interpreting the preceding quotes in the Examiner's Answer as alleging that the data fields (containing data pertaining to web browsing by the consultant browser during a session) in session table 145 is the consultant context created by the WTS server 145. Thus, the created consultant context contains data pertaining to web browsing by the consultant browser during a session.

Therefore since there is only one "context information" in claim 47, the Examiner's Answer is arguing that both the user context and the consultant context record the same "context information", which is inconsistent with the preceding argument in the Examiner's Answer that the data stored in the user context pertains to data associated with web browsing by the user browser and the data stored in the consultant context pertains to data associated with web browsing by the consultant browser.

Appellant asserts that a careful examination of the language of claim 47 reveals that the "context information" is the same "context information" in the step of "storing the received context information in the consultant context" and the step of "storing the identified context information in the user context". In particular, the "context information", which is recited in claim 47 as "identifying an access to the desired information", relates to web browsing by the consultant context ("responsive to the second user navigating to the desired information, said consultant browser transmitting to the server context information identifying an access to the desired information; said server receiving the transmitted context information and storing the received context information in the consultant context"). Claim 47 recites subsequently storing the "context information" in the user context ("using the stored association relating to the identifier to identify the context information stored in the consultant context; after said server

using the stored association, said server storing the identified context information in the user context”).

Thus, the preceding argument in the Examiner’s Answer is logically incorrect, because Shelton does not disclose that the same “context information” is stored in both the user context and the consultant context.

If the Examiner’s Answer is instead interpreting the user context and the consultant context as both being the session table 145, then Shelton does not satisfy the two distinct steps of “creating a user context” and “creating a consultant context”, since the session table 145 is created only once (i.e., when the table metadata, and hence the table structure, is defined). Furthermore, Shelton does not disclose storing the same “context information” twice in the session table 145 as required by the two storing steps in claim 47 (i.e., “storing the received context information in the consultant context” and “storing the identified context information in the user context”).

Therefore, Sheldon in view of Gavrilesu does not disclose the preceding feature of claim 47.

A second reason why claim 47 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilesu is that Sheldon in view of Gavrilesu does not teach or suggest the feature: “a first user of the user browser identifying, to a second user of the consultant browser by communication via telephone or email from the first user to the second user, information that the first user is unable to locate and desires to obtain”.

The Examiner’s Answer relies on Gavrilesu, Par. [0003] which recites: “In cobrowsing, as one user browses the web with his or her web browser, other users see the same web pages on

their web browsers. That is, the latter users' web browsers are synchronized with the former user's web browser. Cobrowsing is useful in many different situations. For example, in electronic commerce, a customer service representative can cobrowse a merchant's web site with a customer. The representative may lead the cobrowsing session, showing the customer where certain products are described on the web site."

The Examiner's Answer, page 11, line 15 - page 12, line 4 argues: "It is the examiners position that in order for the representative to show a customer where certain products are described on a web site, the customer must identify what product they are trying to locate. It is well known in the art that customer representatives provide support for customers when trying to locate particular information. It is evident from Gavrilesu's disclosure that a user will identify information that they are unable to locate in order for the representative to lead the cobrowsing session and show the user where the identified products are located. *Gavrilesu may not explicitly disclose identifying information that the first user is unable to locate and desires to obtain*, but one skilled in the art would recognize that cobrowsing between a customer representative and a customer provides this benefit by showing the customer where certain products are described on a web site." (emphasis added)

In response, Appellant first point out that the Examiner's Answer, page 1, line 21 - page 12, line 2 acknowledges that "Gavrilesu may not explicitly disclose identifying information that the first user is unable to locate and desires to obtain".

In further response, Appellant asserts that the argument in the Examiner's Answer that "a customer provides this benefit by showing the customer where certain products are described on a web site" is not a disclosure of the representative identifying to the customer information that the customer is *unable to locate* and desires to obtain.

In order to conclude that the customer is unable to locate the information identified to the customer by the representative, the customer would have had to attempt and fail to locate this information, which Gavrilesco does not disclose. To the contrary, it is obvious that the customer would not have attempted to locate this information because there is no need to do so, since the customer knows that the representative will identify this information to the customer via the cobrowsing session.

Furthermore, Appellant asserts that the stated motivation in the Examiner's Answer for incorporating the preceding feature of claim 47 into Shelton is not persuasive. The Examiner's Answer page 7, lines 1-3 argues: "One would have been motivated to make such a combination because implementing web browser synchronization for guiding a user to information is well known in the art, as described by Gavrilesco (Paragraph 0003)." In response, Appellant disputes the argument in the Examiner's Answer that performing an action is motivated by the action being known in the art.

Appellant asserts that Gavrilesco teaches away from incorporating preceding feature of claim 47 into Shelton due to failure to allow synchronization with sufficient granularity. In particular, Shelton's method of browsing is by accessing a web page via a URL that points to the address of the web page, as described by Shelton, col. 7, lines 5-41 and as acknowledged in the Examiner's Answer, page 14, lines 6-15. However, Gavrilesco, Par [0006] teaches away from cobrowsing through use of the address of a web page by reciting:

"as the lead user of the cobrowsing session navigates different web pages, the addresses of those web pages, also known as hyperlinks, are sent to the other users. The web browser of each user downloads the web page independently of the other users. ... However, the hyperlinks approach is disadvantageous in that it is not very granular. Many web pages are very large, and contain a significant

amount of information. Usually, a user is interested only in a part of a web page, such that he or she may have to scroll within the web page so that the desired part, containing the desired information, is viewable. Since only the address of the web page is sent to the other users, however, the lead user has no way to indicate which part of the web page is of interest. The granularity of the hyperlinks approach, in other words, is on a web page basis, and does not allow synchronization on a more granular, partial web page basis.”

Thus, incorporating the preceding feature of claim 47 into Sheldon would result in cobrowsing with insufficient granularity and is therefore not obvious.

Therefore, Sheldon in view of Gavrilesco does not disclose the preceding feature of claim 47.

A third reason why claim 47 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilesco is that Sheldon in view of Gavrilesco does not teach or suggest the feature: “responsive to the first user identifying the desired information to the second user, said second user navigating to the desired information using the consultant browser”.

As argued *supra* by Appellant with respect to the second reason, the first user (i.e., the customer) does not identify to the second user (i.e., the representative) the desired information that the first user is unable to locate. Thus, the navigation by the second user cannot be responsive to the first user identifying the desired information to the second user.

Therefore, Sheldon in view of Gavrilesco does not disclose the preceding feature of claim 47.

A fourth reason why claim 47 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu is that Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu does not teach or suggest the feature: "said server generating the identifier in response to the received request, ... said server storing the identifier ... in a repository coupled to the server and providing the identifier to the consultant browser".

Appellant asserts that the language in the preceding feature of claim 47 requires that a same server both generates the identifier and provides the identifier to the consultant browser, which Shelton does not disclose.

The Examiner's Answer argues that:

"Shelton further teaches in Col. 7 lines 31-35, "an ID unique to browser 114A" and "creates a session for browser 114A based on the unique ID". It is the examiners position that the identifier is the unique ID used to create a session." (Examiner's Answer, page 14, lines 19-21);

"The unique ID is used to identify the session within a session table" (Examiner's Answer, page 15, line 16); and

"Shelton clearly teaches a server storing the identifier ... in a repository coupled to the server" (Examiner's Answer, page 16, lines 12-13).

In response, Appellant confirms the Examiner's allegation that: the unique session ID is generated by WTS server 144 (see Shelton, col. 7, lines 31-35), the unique session ID is stored in the session table (see Shelton, FIG. 6), and the session table 145 is coupled to the WTS server 144 by being disposed within the WTS server 144 (see Shelton, FIG. 3).

However, Shelton does not disclose that the WTS server 144 that generates the unique session ID also provides the unique session ID to the browser 114A as required by the preceding feature of claim 47. Moreover, the Examiner does not even allege that the WTS server 144 provides the unique session ID to the browser 114A.

Appellant notes that Shelton, col. 7, lines 19-35 recites that “HTTP server 152 sends ... SessionID Applet to browser 114A ... , browser 114A stores ... SessionID Applet 1228A into memory area 115A” ..., “Master Applet 126 sends WTS server 144 a command, together with an ID unique to browser 114A. In response to the command from Master Applet 126, WTS server 144 creates a session for browser 114A based on the unique ID”.

Thus, the WTS server 144 generates the unique session ID and HTTP server 152 sends (i.e., provides) SessionID Applet to browser 114A, which does not satisfy the requirement in claim 47 that a same server both generates the session ID and provide the session ID to the browser 114A.

Therefore, Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu does not disclose the preceding feature of claim 47.

A fifth reason why claim 47 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu is that Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu does not teach or suggest the feature: “after said consultant browser providing the identifier to the second user, said second user providing the identifier to the first user via telephone or email from the second user to the first user; after said second user providing the identifier to the first user, said user browser receiving the identifier from the first user; after said user browser receiving the identifier from the first user, *said server receiving the identifier from the user browser, wherein said receiving the identifier from the user browser comprises retrieving the identifier from a data entry field of a web page* after the user browser has entered the identifier into the data entry field”.

The Examiner’s Answer, page 18, lines 4-8 and 18-22 argues: “Shelton, col. 12 lines 28-29, clearly teaches the identified limitations. As taught by Shelton, the consumer (which is

using browser 114A at terminal 104A) tells the agent (which is using browser 114N at terminal 104N) via telephone the currently displayed session ID. *The agent then types the current Session ID (which was given to the agent via telephone from the consumer) into a text box...* Appellant further argues that Shelton fails to disclose "said server receiving the identifier from the user browser". The examiner respectfully disagrees. While col. 12 lines 28-39 of Shelton may not disclose this limitation, the next paragraph col. 12 lines 40-46 teaches that *after the session ID is entered into the text box, a command is sent to the server to retrieve the information associated with the session."*

In response, Appellant acknowledges that the WTS server 144 receives the identifier (i.e., the current session ID) from a data entry field of text box 804 as the Examiner argues (see Shelton, col. 12, lines 39-46). However, text box 804 is not a text box of a web page as required by the preceding feature of claim 47, but rather is text box of the agent session interface 800A (see Shelton, FIG. 8A) created for the agent by the Agent Applet at step 712 of Shelton FIG. 7 (see Shelton, col. 11, lines 26-34). Shelton does not disclose that text box 804 of the agent session interface 800A is a web page. In fact, since agent session interface 800A is specifically created to enable an agent at terminal 104N to communicate with the server, it does not make any sense for the text box 804 of the agent session interface 800A to be a web page.

Therefore, Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu does not disclose the preceding feature of claim 47.

A sixth reason why claim 47 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu is that Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu does not teach or suggest the feature: "after said server receiving the identifier from the user browser, said server identifying the stored identifier in the

repository from the received identifier and **using** the stored association relating to the identifier to identify the context information stored in the consultant context”(emphasis added).

The Examiner’s Answer, page 19, lines 6-11 argues: “As discussed above, the Session ID is used to identify context information stored in the session table. Therefore, when a session ID is entered into the text box (as discussed in reply to appellants tenth argument) and then sent to the server, the server **can** then retrieve the information stored in the session table (which has been previously identified as context information in the response to appellants seventh argument) based on the received current session ID.” (emphasis added)

In response, Appellant notes that the preceding feature of claim 47 is claiming actually performing the step of “**using** the stored association relating to the identifier to identify the context information stored in the consultant context”, which Shelton does not disclose and which the preceding argument in the Examiner’s Answer does not even allege being disclosed by Shelton. Instead, the preceding argument in the Examiner’s Answer merely alleges that the “**can** then retrieve the information stored in the session table ... based on the received current session ID”, which is not claimed in the preceding feature of claim 47.

Therefore, Sheldon in view of Gavrilesco does not disclose the preceding feature of claim 47.

Based on the preceding arguments, Appellant respectfully maintains that claim 47 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilesco, and that claim 47 is in condition for allowance.

Claim 48

The Examiner's Answer argues: "In regard to claim 48, Sheldon clearly discloses that all the method steps shown in claim 47 are implemented in a server (*Fig 1 element 134*). Therefore the rejections articulated *supra* as to why the combination of Sheldon and Gavrilesu teach the claimed subject matter of claim 47 apply to claim 48."

In response, Appellant will apply the arguments in the Examiner's Answer for claim 47 to claim 48.

Appellant respectfully contends that claim 48 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilesu, because Sheldon in view of Gavrilesu does not teach or suggest each and every feature of claim 48.

A first reason why claim 48 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilesu is that Sheldon in view of Gavrilesu does not teach or suggest the feature:

"a server *creating a user context* that reflects a context of a session between a user browser and the server;

said server *creating a consultant context* that reflects a context of a session between a consultant browser and the server;

said server *storing context information in the consultant context* ...,

said server *storing the identified context information in the user context*" (emphasis added).

The Examiner's Answer, page 10, lines 12-14 recites: "The server then manages, tracks, and records all the activities of the browser participating in the session. The recorded activities clearly demonstrate a context of a session between a browser and a server."

The Examiner's Answer, page 10, line 20 - page 11, line 5 recites: "The only difference between the limitations is the use of "consultant" instead of "user" when labeling the browsers and context. As indicated in the cited passages of Shelton, all browsers, whether labeled as a "user" browser or "consultant" browser, are managed and tracked by the server in order to establish sessions and record activities associated with the browsers and server. Therefore Shelton does in fact teach creating context for two browsers, which could be labeled as "user" and "consultant" respectively."

In response, Appellant is interpreting the preceding quotes in the Examiner's Answer as alleging that the data fields (containing data pertaining to web browsing by the user browser during a session) in session table 145 (see Shelton, FIG. 6 and col. 9 line 63 - col. 10, line 54) is the user context created by the WTS server 145 (see Shelton, FIG. 1). Thus, the created user context contains data pertaining to web browsing by the user browser during a session.

Similarly, Appellant is interpreting the preceding quotes in the Examiner's Answer as alleging that the data fields (containing data pertaining to web browsing by the consultant browser during a session) in session table 145 is the consultant context created by the WTS server 145. Thus, the created consultant context contains data pertaining to web browsing by the consultant browser during a session.

Therefore since there is only one "context information" in claim 48, the Examiner's Answer is arguing that both the user context and the consultant context record the same "context information", which is inconsistent with the preceding argument in the Examiner's Answer that the data stored in the user context pertains to data associated with web browsing by the user browser and the data stored in the consultant context pertains to data associated with web browsing by the consultant browser.

Appellant asserts that a careful examination of the language of claim 48 reveals that the “context information” is the same “context information” in the step of “storing the context information in the consultant context” and the step of “storing the identified context information in the user context”. In particular, the “context information” relates to web browsing by the consultant context (“said server storing context information in the consultant context after the context information was received by the server from the consultant browser ... and after the second user navigated to the desired information using the consultant browser”). Claim 48 recites subsequently storing the “context information” in the user context (“after said server using the stored association, said server storing the identified context information in the user context”).

Thus, the preceding argument in the Examiner’s Answer is logically incorrect, because Shelton does not disclose that the same “context information” is stored in both the user context and the consultant context.

If the Examiner’s Answer is instead interpreting the user context and the consultant context as both being the session table 145, then Shelton does not satisfy the two distinct steps of “creating a user context” and “creating a consultant context”, since the session table 145 is created only once (i.e., when the table metadata, and hence the table structure, is defined). Furthermore, Shelton does not disclose storing the same “context information” twice in the session table 145 as required by the two storing steps in claim 48 (i.e., “storing context information in the consultant context” and “storing the identified context information in the user context”).

Therefore, Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu does not disclose the preceding feature of claim 48.

A second reason why claim 48 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilesescu is that Sheldon in view of Gavrilesescu does not teach or suggest the feature: : “said server generating the identifier in response to the received request, ... said server storing the identifier ... in a repository coupled to the server and providing the identifier to the consultant browser”.

Appellant asserts that the language in the preceding feature of claim 48 requires that a same server both generates the identifier and provides the identifier to the consultant browser, which Sheldon does not disclose.

The Examiner’s Answer argues that:

“Shelton further teaches in Col. 7 lines 31-35, “an ID unique to browser 114A” and “creates a session for browser 114A based on the unique ID”. It is the examiners position that the identifier is the unique ID used to create a session.” (Examiner’s Answer, page 14, lines 19-21);

“The unique ID is used to identify the session within a session table” (Examiner’s Answer, page 15, line 16); and

“Shelton clearly teaches a server storing the identifier ... in a repository coupled to the server” (Examiner’s Answer, page 16, lines 12-13).

In response, Appellant confirms the Examiner’s allegation that: the unique session ID is generated by WTS server 144 (see Sheldon, col. 7, lines 31-35) and the unique session ID is stored in the session table (see Sheldon, FIG. 6) and the session table 145 is coupled to the WTS server 144 by being disposed within the WTS server 144 (see Sheldon, FIG. 3).

However, Sheldon does not disclose that the WTS server 144 that generates the unique session ID also provides the unique session ID to the browser 114A as required by the preceding

feature of claim 48. Moreover, the Examiner does not even allege that the WTS server 144 provides the unique session ID to the browser 114A.

Appellant notes that Shelton, col. 7, lines 19-35 recites that “HTTP server 152 sends ... SessionID Applet to browser 114A ... , browser 114A stores ... SessionID Applet 1228A into memory area 115A” ..., “Master Applet 126 sends WTS server 144 a command, together with an ID unique to browser 114A. In response to the command from Master Applet 126, WTS server 144 creates a session for browser 114A based on the unique ID”.

Thus, the WTS server 144 generates the unique session ID and HTTP server 152 sends (i.e., provides) SessionID Applet to browser 114A, which does not satisfy the requirement in claim 48 that a same server both generates the session ID and provide the session ID to the browser 114A.

Therefore, Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu does not disclose the preceding feature of claim 48.

A third reason why claim 48 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu is that Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu does not teach or suggest the feature: “said server receiving the identifier from the user browser after the consultant browser provided the identifier to the second user and after the second user provided the identifier to the first user via telephone or email from the second user to the first user and after the first user provided the identifier to the user browser, *wherein said receiving the identifier from the user browser comprises retrieving the identifier from a data entry field of a web page* after the user browser has entered the identifier into the data entry field”.

The Examiner's Answer, page 18, lines 4-8 and 18-22 argues: "Shelton, col. 12 lines 28-29, clearly teaches the identified limitations. As taught by Shelton, the consumer (which is using browser 114A at terminal 104A) tells the agent (which is using browser 114N at terminal 104N) via telephone the currently displayed session ID. *The agent then types the current Session ID (which was given to the agent via telephone from the consumer) into a text box...* Appellant further argues that Shelton fails to disclose "said server receiving the identifier from the user browser". The examiner respectfully disagrees. While col. 12 lines 28-39 of Shelton may not disclose this limitation, the next paragraph col. 12 lines 40-46 teaches that *after the session ID is entered into the text box, a command is sent to the server to retrieve the information associated with the session."*

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Therefore, Sheldon in view of Gavrilescu does not disclose the preceding feature of claim 48.

A fourth reason why claim 48 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilesco is that Sheldon in view of Gavrilesco does not teach or suggest the feature: “after said server receiving the identifier from the user browser, said server identifying the stored identifier in the repository from the received identifier and **using** the stored association relating to the identifier to identify the context information stored in the consultant context”(emphasis added).

The Examiner’s Answer, page 19, lines 6-11 argues: “As discussed above, the Session ID is used to identify context information stored in the session table. Therefore, when a session ID is entered into the text box (as discussed in reply to appellants tenth argument) and then sent to the server, the server **can** then retrieve the information stored in the session table (which has been previously identified as context information in the response to appellants seventh argument) based on the received current session ID.” (emphasis added)

In response, Appellant notes that the preceding feature of claim 48 is claiming actually performing the step of “**using** the stored association relating to the identifier to identify the context information stored in the consultant context”, which Shelton does not disclose and which the preceding argument in the Examiner’s Answer does not even allege being disclosed by Shelton. Instead, the preceding argument in the Examiner’s Answer merely alleges that the “**can** then retrieve the information stored in the session table ... based on the received current session ID”, which is not claimed in the preceding feature of claim 48.

Therefore, Sheldon in view of Gavrilesco does not disclose the preceding feature of claim 48.

Based on the preceding arguments, Appellant respectfully maintains that claim 48 is not unpatentable over Sheldon in view of Gavrilesco, and that claim 48 is in condition for allowance.

SUMMARY

In summary, Appellant respectfully requests reversal of the August 1, 2008 Office Action rejection of claims 47 and 48.

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